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Reviewed by Michael L. Richmond*
"Stare decisis et non quieta movere." The sepuchral words roll from
the hidebound pages of Bouvier's, bearing the tradition of the throaty
chimes of Big Ben. No phrase better typifies the methodology of the
common law, no single group of words better represents the unbroken
skein of judicial reasoning binding us to an England yet to hear those
notes resonating across the Thames. The common law attorney, wher-
ever located, still feels the compulsion "to stand by the decision and
not move that which is settled." Yet the same revolutionary fervor
which caused the founding fathers "to dissolve the political bands"'
connecting the colonies with Mother England also found expression in
the treatment of precedent in the courts of the new nation. Certainly,
the drafters of the Declaration of Independence maintained a healthy
respect for the system of British jurisprudence. One of the grievances
against King George listed was his ". . . abolishing the free system of
English laws in a neighbouring province . . .,,2 However, the new
courts tended to shy away from this precedent, adopting it when appro-
priate, but feeling no compunctions in ignoring it.
Many reasons have been advanced for this action of the post-colo-
nial judges. Beveridge certainly makes a forceful case for Mr. Chief
Justice Marshall's lack of precedents in his opinions as resulting from
"the meagerness of his learning in the law." 3 Undeniably, law books
were not accorded the highest priority in cargo bound for the New
World. Still, as Beveridge continues, ". . . at a later period, when
precedents were more abundant and accessible, he [Marshall] still ig-
nored them."'
* Assistant Professor of Law, Nova Law Center, Fort Lauderdale, Florida. A.B.,
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1. DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE, 1 Stat. 1 (1776).
2. Id. at 2.
3. II A. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 178 (1916).
4. Id. at 179.
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Certainly the practice of the greatest of the early Chief Justices
contributed to what became a very lax view of adherence to precedent.
Another factor may have been the total inapplicability of English pre-
cedent to the new Constitution. "In constitutional law stare decisis has
been applied with much less rigor than in other fields of law, on the
theoretical ground that it is the Constitution which is the basic stan-
dard and not the previous decisions of the Court."5 Whatever the rea-
son, our courts interpreting the Constitution have not felt constrained
to abide by their own decisions (much less those of England) when the
tenor of society demanded otherwise. This willingness to accept change
(or, less charitably, this desire to individualize the law) reflects in vary-
ing degree in all other areas of the law as interpreted by United States
courts. The most prominent legal theorists of the country have earned
the collective term of "legal realists" in their advocation of relaxed
acceptance of precedent. Yet what began as a moderate relaxation has
today evolved into what some of our contemporaries view as a total
abnegation of established rules.
An American edition of Blackstone's COMMENTARIES presents an
interesting comparison of the English and American approaches.
Blackstone's test is imperative: "The doctrine of the law then is this:
that precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or un-
just: for though their reason be not obvious at first view, yet we owe
such a deference to former times as not to suppose that they acted
wholly without consideration." ' The commentator's note, however, tells
us something different:
The rule that established precedents should be adhered to and followed,
although it is a general principle wherever the common-law is in force, is
not so rigidly observed as to prevent courts of appellate jurisdiction from
overruling previous decisions which are deemed to be erroneous and
unreasonable.'
5. C. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE USES OF HISTORY 16-17 (1969).
See also A. MASON & W. BEANEY, THE SUPREME COURT IN A FREE SOCIETY 22-24
(1959); W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 18
(1974).
6. W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND 36 (Chase's 4th
ed. 1925).
7. Id. at 36 n.2.
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Thus, the English and United States versions differ, perhaps only
slightly in test, but considerably in meaning. The development of this
change marshalls some of the greatest figures in contemporary juris-
prudence, marking perhaps the greatest break between English and
American legal theory. However, even before these theorists spoke,
precedential value was questioned. By the turn of the century, one his-
torian of the law noted:
Adherence to precedent is useful; but it no longer controls. It is no
longer a ground for decision that a question involved has been decided in
a certain way by another court or by the same court on a previous occa-
sion. Precedent is persuasive, but no longer decisive. .... I
Gray's criticism of strict adherence to precedent lay in the danger
of accepting as morally right a rule which exists simply because of its
venerability. Morality should govern tradition, rather than the reverse.
"The decision of a court may unite the character of a judicial prece-
dent with the character of an expression of wise thought or of sound
morals, but often these characters are separated." 9 Yet Gray did not go
so far as to demand rejection of precedent. His position instead re-
quired harmonizing past decisions with contemporary policy, and using
the rationale and logic of past courts to solve current problems. "After
all, judicial precedents are only words, written in the past by some
judge, and it is only as currently interpreted that they have impact on
the community."' 10
Frank found reliance on precedent to be "illusory."" Indeed, his
criticism of the system of precedent goes to the very foundations them-
selves, questioning the worth of relying on imperfectly reported prior
cases. How, he asks, can later judges accurately determine the mental
processes by which their predecessors decided the disputes with which
they were faced? Judges do not report their entire thoughts and impres-
sions-indeed, they lack the training and capability to do so even if
they so desired. Thus, the entire system is suspect. Despite this, Frank
8. M. MORRIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF
LAW 303 (1909).
9. JOHN CHIPMANLGRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 200 (2d ed.
1921).
10. T. BENDITT, LAW As RULE AND PRINCIPLE 7 (1978).
I. JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 152 (1936).
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refuses to advocate desertion of the system. It still presents a perfectly
valid method ofodetermining disputes, for
[i]f we relinquish the assumption that law can be made mathemati-
cally certain, if we honestly recognize the judicial process as involving
unceasing adjustment and individualization, we may be able to reduce
the uncertainty which characterizes much of our present judicial output
to the extent that such uncertainty is undesirable. By abandoning an in-
fantile hope of absolute legal certainty we may augment the amount of
actual legal certainty."
Cardozo, too, felt unduly confined by precedent.
Battered and pelted, we grope for a principle of order that will compose
the jarring atoms, . . . for a rationalizing principle whereby precedents
that are outworn may be decenly discarded without affront to the senti-
ment that there shall be no breach of the legal order in the house of its
custodians. 3
His statement reflects the struggle of the "legal realists" to retain the
principles of law while accepting a flexible application of stare decisis.
Tritely, they did not want to send the cleansed jurisprudence down the
drain along with the bath water now befouled by the elimination of
stale precedent."'
Contemporary writers have'abandoned this moderate stance. They
recognize that to a great extent judges continue to seek at least gui-
dance and frequently control from prior cases. One commentator at-
tributes this to self-preservation, for judges who disregard precedent
frequently find their decisions reversed, while courts refusing to follow
their own cases will not themselves .be followed.15
For whatever reason, the new breed of computer devotees and
12. Id. at 159.
13. Address of Benjamin N. Cardozo to the New York State Bar Association in
New York City (Jan. 22, 1932), in SELECTED WRITINGS 8-9 (1947).
14. "The theme of the legal realists is not, then, that courts ought to disregard
established rules in the process of reaching decisions. The point which they wished to
emphasize is, rather, that the consideration of such rules ought not to be the decisive
method by which decisions are reached." W. RUMBLE, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 190
(1968).
15. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (2d ed. 1977).
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statisticians would throw over precedent and restructure the law along
more relevant lines. Destroy the building, they urge, when "the pillars,
main beams, or indeed any essential parts of the structure are rot-
ten.""6 We need only look to the causes for dissent on the Supreme
Court to see that the greatest fomenter of judicial disharmony is the
debate on adherence to precedent in the face of social need. 7 At the
very least, let us have frequent turnover in judicial precedent. Judicial
opinions and capital assets are analogous: "[a]s old precedents obso-
lesce, eventually ceasing to be a part of the usable stock of precedents,
new ones are added to the stock through litigation."' 8 Now is the time
for all good computers.to come to the aid of the law. 9
Fortunately, in this time of troubled theory, a new voice comes to
us-a voice that has been urging reforms in England, yet which returns
us to the moderate, sensible world of the legal realists. In a brilliant
volume that gives as much pleasure to read as it does in provoking
thought, an eminent British jurist advocates reshaping the law, but do-
ing so by continuing to use the theory behind cases of the past no
longer directly relevant to contemporary society."0 This call for change
in England sounds to Americans as a plea for a reasoned approach to
judicial decision-making: one which draws on the past yet seeks to ap-
ply it to present problems rather than to either reject it absolutely as
no longer relevant or to follow it slavishly as an inflexible dictate.
Lord Denning does not stand alone among British jurists and legal
thinkers, although advocates of easing the burden of precedent consti-
tute, at best, a minority. Among others, H.L.A. Hart strongly ques-
tions the propriety of unswerving adherence to prior cases, although
recognizing that to be accepted practice. Hart's "rule-scepticism" for
judicial precedent springs from three observations.
First, there is no single method of determining the rule for which a given
authoritative precedent is an authority. . . . Secondly, there is no au-
thoritative or uniquely correct formulation of any rule to be extracted
16. C. HYNEMAN, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL 230 (1964).
17. P. JACKSON, DISSENT IN THE SUPREME COURT 7 (1969).
18. POSNER, supra note 15, at 420.
19. C. F. Sigler, A Cybernetic Model of the Judicial System, 41 TEMPLE L. Q.
398 (1968).
20. LORD DENNING, THE DISCIPLINE OF LAW (1979) [hereinafter cited as
DENNING].
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from cases. .... Thirdly, .. courts deciding a later case may reach an
opposite decision to that in a precedent by narrowing the rule extracted
...[or] discard a restriction found in the rule as formulated from the
earlier case, on the ground that it is not required by any rule established
by statute or earlier precedent.2
Thus, whether because rules cannot be determined in a uniform man-
ner or with certainty, or because in practice the judiciary has 'ample
tools at its disposal to avoid the general principle, Hart questions the
wisdom of total obedience to precedent.
Denning, too, questions precedent on a purely theoretical basis.
He goes beyond this, however, to consider the effect of strict stare deci-
sis on practitioners and judges. For the attorney, it means: "He can
argue either way as you please." More significantly, to the judge it
means one of two things. The individual judge ". . . does not have to
think for himself or to decide for himself. It has already been decided
on the previous authority." For most judges, however, the result is
even more insidious:
Whilst ready to applaud the doctrine of precedent when it leads to a just
and fair result, they become restless under it when they are compelled by
it to do what is unjust or unfair. This restlessness leads them to various
expedients to get round a previous authority.22
Judges are thus tempted into the intellectual dishonesty of accepting a
rule of decision when it pleases them and, working under cover of the
rule (as Hart also noted), avoiding its effects-a mild form of hypoc-
risy which, although perhaps justified as a means to a laudable end,
nonetheless compromises the underlying rationale and ostensibly logi-
cal process of judicial reasoning.
Lord Denning's efforts to turn the tide have extended as far as his
stepping down from the House of Lords to accept a seat on the inferior
Court of Appeals. Realizing that dissent was futile in the Parliamen-
tary court, he elected to sit on a bench where his voice might be heard
more forcefully-where his influence could work greater good although
he would suffer a resulting loss of personal status. "In the Court of
Appeals it [dissent] is some good. On occasion a head-note there says:
21. H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 131 (1961).
22. DENNING at 285.
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'Lord Denning dissenting.' "2
This same dedication to and love of the Law and desire to see it
improve and more accurately deal with contemporary problems reflects
throughout the pages of the book. The dedication and vitality of the
man impel the reader through his work, making it a pleasant as well as
an enlightening experience. For the joy Lord Denning experiences in
the law and transmits to his reader, this volume would be highly rec-
ommended to all attorneys and legal scholars. Yet it goes beyond this,
for we find a thoughtful, reasoned chronicle of cases in which prece-
dent's dictates led to decisions which were unquestionably morally
flawed. In these cases, Lord Denning would have overruled prior deci-
sions and thus permitted the law to mirror society's sense of propriety
and to grow in the process.
Unfortunately, Lord Denning bypassed an ideal opportunity to re-
spond to the well-reasoned criticism of Julius Stone. 4 Stone examined
the opinion of the Court of Appeals in Boys v. Chaplin,5 in which
Lord Denning, writing for the majority, did not follow a precedent
which he deemed erroneous. Stone viewed Denning's attempt to over-
rule the earlier case as exposing ". . . the potential of creative chaos
existing behind a fragile shell of orderly, settled precedent. '2 6 Rather
than overruling the case, Stone would have in some way distinguished
it, as Denning's fellow judges attempted to do.
This case, in short, illustrates well the unwillingness of judges to recog-
nize the rather inescapable import for the theory of binding precedent of
their own use of precedent. Most appellate judges apparently continue to
believe that stability with growth within the common law turns somehow
on whether the rule of the Young case should be formally abandoned.
Yet, by their actual techniques of handling legal issues, they constantly
demonstrate their own freedom to limit the scope within which prece-
dents are binding, so that the question of formal abandonment may be
23. Id. at 287.
24. Stone, A. Court of Appeal in Search of Itself, 71 COLUM. L. REV. 1420
(1971).
25. Boys v. Chaplin, [1968] 2 Q.B. 1, afld [1969] 2 All E.R. 1085 (H.L.).
26. Stone, supra note 24 at 1441.
27. Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co., [1944] K.B. 718 (C.A.). This case binds the
Court of Appeals to its own decisions, while creating a limited class of vague excep-
tions to the principle of strict adherence. See Stone, supra note 24 at 1420.
-- AA
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one that rarely need arise."8
Stone has long espoused the principle of strict adherence, yet has
tempered it by relying on the creativity of judges to find ways of avoid-
ing any harsh effects. 9 As has been noted, this places the judge in jeop-
ardy of creating forced exceptions to the general rule to avoid violating
a general principle which would lead to a harsh result. The jurist thus
must resolve the impossible dilema of whether the ends (maintaining
the stiff upper lip of precedent) justify the means (strained readings of
cases and a proliferation of hypertechnical exceptions). Although Lord
Denning addresses the issue generally throughout the book, he never
comes to grips with the criticism as it relates to Boys It is never men-
tioned-even in passing.
This small criticism aside, Lord Denning has produced a marvel-
ous work which should be read by all those who must work with prece-
dent and should be in any serious legal collection. He sounds the clar-
ion of change: in Great Britain, change which moves forward
creatively; in the United States, change which retrenches to a more
moderate, more meaningful position. At the same time, the force and
beauty of his prose add immeasurably to the strength of his argument.
Let it not be thought from this discourse that I am against the doctrine
of precedent. I am not. . . . All that I am against is its too rigid applica-
tion-a rigidity which insists that a bad precedent must necessarily be
followed. You must follow it certainly so as to reach your end. But you
must not let the path become too overgrown. You must cut out the dead
wood and trim off the side branches, else you will find yourself lost in
thickets and brambles. My plea is simply to keep the path to justice
clear of obstructions which impede it."°
28. Stone, supra note 24 at 1442 (footnote added).
29. E.g., J. STONE, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF LAW AND JUSTICE 656 el seq. (1966);
J. STONE, THE PROVINCE AND FUNCTION OF LAW 166 et seq. (1961).
30. DENNING at 314.
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Sirica, John J., To Set The Record Straight. W. W. N orton and Co.,
1979 pp. 394, $15.00
Reviewed by Ronald Benton Brown*
Judge John Sirica has presented his view of the Watergate affair and
his role in it in To SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT.' While the judge
would never be accused of being a great writer, his narrative is ex-
tremely interesting. It allows us to vicariously experience the two most
significant trials of the century and the monumental confrontation be-
tween the executive and judicial branches of the federal government
which resulted from the battle from the Watergate tapes. It also
reveals the author as a person caught in the pivotal position in this
confrontation. Judge Sirica's story may eliminate some of the doubts
about the conduct of the trials of the Watergate burglars and conspira-
tors and it does seem to successfully justify the sentences of those de-
fendants. It does little, however, to convince us that the integrity of our
legal system survived the Watergate crisis.
Judge Sirica describes himself as a regular trial judge, one of hun-
dreds of District Court Judges, in fact, "an obscure judge."' 2 Surpris-
ingly, he is thrust into a conflict with the President of the United
States, a man for whom Sirica practically brags that he had voted. But
he recognizes his duty; how he lives up to that duty is the heart of this
narrative. It is easy to identify with him and sympathize with his strug-
gle. Understandably, he admits to few errors in his handling of the
trials.
In the trial of the Watergate burglars, however, he reveals that he
suspected a coverup even before the trial started. Before becoming a
judge, he had been counsel for the Select Committee of the House of
Representatives on the Federal Communications Commission. There
he had encountered what he believed to be a coverup and resigned his
position, stating, "I don't want it on my conscience that anyone can
* B.S.M.E., 1970, Northeastern University; J.D., 1973, University of Connecti-
cut; L.L.M., 1976, Temple University; Associate Professor of Law, Nova University
Center for the Study of Law.
1. J. SIRICA, To SET THE RECORD STRAIGHT (1979). [hereinafter cited as
SIRICA.]
2. Id. at 143.
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say John Sirica, a resident of the District for many years, is a party to
a whitewash .... "I
This experience, Judge Sirica explains, prepared him to deal with
the attempted coverup in the Watergate case. There is something un-
settling about the trial judge admitting to such suspicions before the
trial. It sounds ominously reminiscent of the Captain in THE CAINE
MUTINY4 insisting that a duplicate key existed.
Judge Sirica admits to moments of anger, frustration, and to less
than ideal judicial demeanor, but reveals nothing substantial enough in
this account to lead the reader to conclude that the trials were improp-
erly handled. On the other hand, he does little to convince the reader
that they were properly conducted. There is, for example, the conspir-
acy trial which took place after Nixon had already resigned and been
pardoned. The defendants argued that Sirica should not hear the case
because of his participation in the earlier burglary trial and in the
Watergate tapes subpoena case. As the Chief Judge, he had the power
to decide the assignment of these cases. One must wonder if assign-
ment of the case to a different judge would not have contributed at
least to the appearance of fairness. Sirica's reasons, 1) that he was best
qualified to hear the case because he had already "supervised virtually
every aspect of the case"' and, 2) that people might think he avoided
the trial with "the big names"6 leave much to be desired.7
Again referring to the conspiracy trial, Judge Sirica admits that he
felt from the beginning that the defendants had no viable defense and,
therefore, based their hopes on provoking him into making an error.
"Wilson knew that my Italian temper was one of my main weaknesses.
3. Id. at 59.
4. H. WOUK, THE CAINE MUTINY (1954). The Captain there insisted that the
theft of the strawberries had been accomplished by the use of a duplicate key to the
food stores because he had discovered just such a duplicate key in investigating the
theft of food years earlier.
5. SIRICA, at 242.
6. Id.
7. See A.B.A. PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §1.7 The Func-
tion of a Trial Judge (1972), which requires that the trial judge should excuse himself
whenever he believes that "his impartiality can reasonably be questioned." Here Judge
Sirica did the opposite by assigning himself. He could easily have assigned another
judge to hear and avoided any question of impartiality.
10
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From the start he tried to use that weakness to his client's advantage." 8
Judge Sirica congratulates himself on having resisted these attempts,
but the picture of the trials which emerges falls short of the ideal.
Judge Sirica treats us to a number of interesting capsule portraits
of the personalities involved, particularly the lawyers. Alch was "a bit
theatrical and always seemed to be wearing heavy makeup."' Henry
Rothblatt was "flamboyant" with his toupe6 and thin moustache "that
almost seemed to be drawn onto his upper lip with a pencil."" Ben-
Veniste "despite his youth showed a lot of courtroom savvy."'" "Hun-
dley could always be counted on to get off a wisecrack.' ' 2 Frates had
"rugged good looks" and a "deep resonant voice that absolutely domi-
nated the courtroom."' Jill Volner was "quietly competent."' 4 Judge
Sirica reveals the demeanor of the lawyers and the defendants certainly
do make an impression upon the trial judge.
The sentencing of the defendants has been the object of many neg-
ative comments. Judge Sirica's nickname of "Maximum John" com-
bined with his use of provisional sentences 5 has led some to the conclu-
sion that the sentences were overly harsh. His response is clear and
convincing:
To be sure, I have always leaned towards stiffer sentences then some of
my colleagues on the District Court, especially for white collar crimes,
but the outcry about the provisional sentences always ignored two facts;
that they were provisional, and that they were required by the statute I
had used to put off final sentencing. 6
The saga of the subpoena for the Watergate tapes is the most
compelling part of this book. The discovery that the President has a
system to tape record conversations in the White House presented the
Senate Committee, the Watergate Special Prosecutor and the public
8. SIRICA, at 258.
9. Id. at 65.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 73.
12. Id. at 259.
13. Id. at 260.
14. Id. at 262.
15. 18 U.S.C. §4208(b) allows such sentencing.
16. SIRICA, at 119.
11
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with the means for verifying the testimony of those involved, particu-
larly John Dean. There was, unfortunately, one problem. The President
did not believe that these tapes could be subpoenaed.
Sirica, at this point, realized that he was involved in a contest of
strength between the judicial branch and the executive branch over the
claim that these tapes were protected by "Executive Privilege," and it
became clear to him that Nixon was counting on his appointees to the
Supreme Court for support in this claim. Judge Sirica concludes that
the constitutional crisis precipitated has been satisfactorily resolved.
"Despite efforts in our Executive branch to distort the truth, to fabri-
cate a set of facts that looked innocent, the court system served to set
the record straight." 7 But those who have read THE BRETHREN' 8 and
contemplated what might have happened had Nixon ultimately refused
to hand over the tapes may wonder at the accuracy of his assessment.
The grand juries which investigated the Watergate affair are de-
scribed by Judge Sirica as "courageous."' 9 They emerge from this
book as the unnoticed heroes of the entire conflict. They spent arduous
months investigating. They bofe the real burden in-the subpoena battle.
"Here was the Grand Jury made up of ordinary citizens from the Dis-
trict of Columbia, some of them poor people, telling the President of
the United States, the most powerful man in the world, to turn over
the tapes."2 0
On reaching the end of the text, one discovers an appendix which
includes short excerpts from the transcripts of the tapes made in the
White House. Unfortunately, these excerpts are too short to be partic-
ularly informative. Following these are Judge Sirica's opinion and or-
der that the subpoena issued to the President for the Watergate tapes
be obeyed;2' a copy of the opinion of the court of appeals in upholding
that decision;22 a copy of Judge Sirica's opinion on whether the Grand
Jury could release information to the House Judiciary Commiee;23 a
copy of the United States Supreme Court decision upholding the sub-
17. Id. at 301.
18. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN (1979).
19. SIRICA, at 301.
20. Id. at 401.
21. In Re Subpoena to Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1973).
22. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
23. In Re Report and Recommendation of the June 5, 1972 Grand Jury, 370
F.2d 1219 (D.D.C. 1974).
12
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poena;u and finally, a copy of Judge Sirica's order on Liddy's motion
for reduction of sentence32 These opinions are not integrated into the
text. Why sixty pages of this book are devoted to reprinting opinions
which are readily available in any law library remains a mystery.
24. U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
25. U.S. v. Liddy, 397 F Supp. 947 (D.D.C. 1975).
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